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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
undersigned counsel for appellees represent that the named parties, Montford-
Apollo Sugarhouse, L.P. and Guy L. Thomas, are the parties to this interlocutory 
appeal. That the parties Montford Apollo Sugarhouse, L.P., The Brown Bear 
International Corporation, Michael Brown and Guy L. Thomas, are and have been 
the only parties to the litigation. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an award of Attorney's fees in favor 
of Plaintiff-Appellee, Montford-Apollo Sugarhouse, L.P. and against Defendant-
Appellant, Guy Thomas pursuant to an Order dated December 26, 1998 by the 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki. 
EL STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court commit reversible error in awarding attorneys fees 
prior to the entry of final judgment by the District Court? 
2. Did the District court abuse its discretion in awarding unreasonable 
attorneys fees to Plaintiff-Appellee in the amount of $5,488.00 forfees 
allegedly incurred for the preparation of a summary judgment motion. 
3. Did the District Court, in awarding unreasonable attorneys fees to 
Appellee, violate Appellant Thomases rightof equal protection of the law as 
guaranteed by Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14** 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
ffl, APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of with respect to the issue appears to be de novo (as 
purely a question of law). "[A] ppellate review of a Court's determination of the 
law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness.'" State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 936(Utah 1994); "correctness" means "the appellate court decides the matter 
for itself and does not defer to any degree to the trial judge's determination of the 
l 
law." Id: State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); Steffensen v.. Smith's 
Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 490 (Utah App. 1991); Knapstad v. Smith's 
Management Corp.. 774 P.2d 1,2 (Utah App. 1989). 
Additionally, the applicable standard of appellate review in this case, for the 
issues stated appears to be abuse of discretion. State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d 64, 67 
(Utah 1993); Nav v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1993). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Guy Thomas, was the owner of a business in the Sugarhouse 
area. Co-Defendant, Michael Brown, owned a small restaurant, which was also in 
the Sugarhouse area, called the Brown Bear. Mr. Brown was a Utah Jazz player 
and was traded. Subsequently, he no longer was interested in maintaining the 
restaurant, and began to look for someone to sublet the space. Mr. Thomas 
became aware of the opportunity, and submitted a business proposal to the 
landlords, Sugarhouse Development Partnership. This business plan outlined 
plans for a restaurant specializing in gourmet coffees and chicken wings. The 
business plan was approved and the parties negotiated an Assignment/Lease 
Extension Agreement. Following the execution of this lease, Sugarhouse 
Development Partnership negotiated a lease agreement on the space directly next 
to Mr. Thomas' new business. This business was also a gourmet coffee shop, 
Moxie Java. Further, the space leased to Moxie Java did not have bathroom 
facilities, therefore, a hole was punched through to Mr. Thomas' space, so that 
Moxie Java's patrons could use his facilities. Sugarhouse Development 
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Partnership declared bankruptcy and was purchased by the Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Montford-Apollo. 
Following the entrance of the competitive shop, Mr. Thomas' business 
declined rapidly. He approached the new landlord, Montford-Apollo seeking 
release from his lease. He searched for and presented several candidates that were 
willing and capable to assume the lease, but all were rejected by 
Plaintiff/Appellee Montford Apollo. Mr. Thomas could no longer afford the 
lease amount on his failed business. Montford Apollo filed suit against Mr. 
Thomas for the lease amount. 
On April 9, 1996, Defendant/Appellant, Guy Thomas, by and though his 
attorney of record, filed an answer to Plaintiffs complaint. On June 18, 1996, 
after doing initial research, Defendant submitted their First set of Admissions, 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff-Appellee 
Montford Apollo, in which Defendant/Appellant addressed the issue of lack of 
good faith and fair dealing. In their answers to said Admissions and 
Interrogatories, Plaintiff/Appellee avoided all issues involving good faith, 
presumably because Defendant/Appellant had stated "you" in their questions, 
rather than "you and/or your predecessors". 
On July 9, 1996, Plaintiff-Appellee submitted a set of Request for 
Admissions, Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to 
Defendant/Appellant Guy Thomas. Mr. Thomas was out of the Country for a 
period during this time and counsel for Defendant/Appellant was unavailable to 
answer all of the questions, without conferring with Mr. Thomas. Counsel for 
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Defendant/appellant spoke with Plaintiff/Appellee's counsel on several occasions 
confirming that we would supply the answers as soon as possible 
In August 1996, Plaintiff/Appellee supplemented their answers responding to 
the original questions brought by the Defendant in relationship to good faith and 
fair dealings issues. 
Although it had been three months since the requests were served upon 
Defendant-Appellant, Plaintiff-Appellee had not indicated that there was a 
problem waiting for the overdue answers, nor did Plaintiff file a Motion to 
Compel these answers. It is assumed that the Plaintiff-Appellee wanted the 
Requests for Admissions to be deemed admitted, therefore, they filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment against Defendant Guy L. Thomas on September 26, 
1996, without the answers to their discovery. Defendant was finally able to 
complete the Answers to Plaintiff Interrogatories on November 26, 1996 and on 
December 9, 1996, Plaintiff and Defendant argued on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment. It was determined at that time, that Plaintiff would be 
granted Summary Judgment only on the unanswered Admissions, and that 
Defendant would be allowed to amend their answer to the original complaint to 
include the defense of good faith and fair dealings. Further, the Court awarded 
fees to Plaintiff in an amount of $350.00 as well as appropriate fees for filing the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. However, after Defendant-Defendant-Appellant 
and his Counsel were able to speak, most of the Admission would have been 
admitted, since they dealt with non-payment of the lease. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It is the Defendant-Appellant's contention that the District Court abused its 
discretion by awarding Appellee attorneys' fees of $5,488.00 and $350.00 prior to 
the conclusion of the case. The Court allowed Appellant to amend his answer to 
include the defense that Appellee had breached its covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. This breach was based on the fact that Sugarhouse Development 
Partnership, Appellee's predecessor in interest, had placed a gourmet coffee 
shop, Moxie Java, directly adjacent to Appellants place of business, WOW 
Wings. It was established in the Lease Agreement that one of the primary 
products of WOW Wings was to be gourmet coffee. This placement of Moxie 
Java contributed to the failing of Appellant's business. As a result of this failure, 
Appellant Thomas was unable to make his lease payments. 
The only way that attorneys' fees can be awarded in the present case is by the 
agreement of the parties. This agreement allows for the reimbursement of 
attorneys' fees upon a party being "successful". To be successful, it must be 
successful in the final outcome. The case is not over and there has been no final 
outcome. The award of attorneys fees for Appellee for bringing their motion for 
summary judgment is premature, and a serious abuse of discretion of the court. 
Without even addressing the appropriateness of the award of attorneys' fees, 
the amount given for bringing a "boiler plate" motion for summary judgment is 
absurd. $5,488.00 to bring a simple motion for summary judgment for non-
payment under a commercial lease, is unimaginable, especially in view of the 
abilities of the attorneys involved, including efficiency. Further, the amount 
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normally charged for this type of legal work in this community under similar 
circumstances, does not give any basis for this large award of attorneys fees. 
It is important to have the courts accessible to all of its citizens. If Mr. 
Thomas is forced to pay this award of attorneys' fees, it will prevent him from 
pursuing this case to its final conclusion. This barrier will result in the denial of 
equal protection of the law as specified in Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution and the 14 Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
V, ARGUMENT 
Point 1. 
Did the District Court commit reversible error in awarding attorneys fees prior 
to the entry of final judgment by the District Court? 
Utah allows the recovery of attorneys' fees either by statute or by agreement of 
the parties. Estate of Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282, (Utah App. 1992) which states: 
In Utah, attorney fees may only be awarded if authorized by statute 
or contract. See, also.g., Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 
P.2d 414, 419-20(Utah 1989) (quoting Turtle Management, Inc. 
v.Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)); 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 
(Utah App. 1990). 
In the present case any attorneys fee award must be premised on the terms of 
the Lease Agreement. Paragraph 19.02 of the Lease Agreement states, 
19.02 Attorney's Fees. In the event that either the Landlord 
or the Tenant shall institute any action or proceeding 
against the other relating to the provisions of this Lease, or 
any default hereunder, then, and in that event, the 
unsuccessful party in such action or proceeding agrees to 
reimburse the successful party for the reasonable expense 
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of such action including reasonable attorneys' fees and 
disbursements incurred therein by the successful party. 
It would appear that Appellee might be entitled to attorney's fees under the 
lease agreement, which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, but only if Appellee is 
successful in this action. To be successful, Appellee must prevail by way of a 
final judgment. This was pointed out in the case of, General Motors Acceptance 
Corp.v. Martinez, 712 P.2d 243, (Utah 1985), where the Court stated: 
. . . no judgment has yet been entered on the third-party claims in 
compliance with our mandate. No determination has been made as 
to the amount of the judgment to be entered, including attorney 
fees, if appropriate. Until these and any other pending matters are 
resolved by the court below, there has not been a final disposition 
of all the respective liabilities and rights of the parties. We see no 
reason to address in piecemeal fashion the issues ruled on below. 
Burton v. Barken Utah, 696 R2d 1217 (1985). 
Since, Appellee is the successor to the author of this lease agreement and must 
assume responsibility, any ambiguity will be construed against the Appellee as 
maker of the document. 19.02 does not say "partially" successful. It says 
successful. The only way to interpret a successful outcome is to allow the case to 
come to a conclusion and the Appellee must be successful at that time. To 
determine the success, all claims and defenses including breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, must be determined. 
Appellee is entitled to reimbursement of attorneys' fees only if successful in 
the final outcome. This has yet to be determined. Appellant Thomas alleges that 
Appellee, by and through their predecessor in interest, breached the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing by placing an espresso coffee house, Moxie Java, next 
to Defendant Guy Thomas's establishment, especially when, Appellant, in his 
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business plan submitted to Plaintiffs predecessors in interest, showed espresso 
coffee as one of the two primary products of his business. This business plan was 
submitted prior to Mr. Thomas's execution of the assumption of the lease. 
Appellant would not have executed the lease assumption knowing that the 
Landlord was going to place another business selling one of the two primary 
products directly next door. 
It is one thing to have another espresso coffee purveyor in the same shopping 
center, but another to have that purveyor of espresso coffee placed in the adjacent 
space. Landlord's audacity was further compounded, when, it then asked Mr. 
Thomas to allow a door to be cut in the wall between Moxie Java and his 
business, WOW Wings, to give access to the customers and employees of the 
Moxie Java to use Mr. Thomas's establishment's restrooms. 
Until this matter is brought to a final disposition in the lower court, any 
determination of attorneys fees, even the $350.00 awarded to Plaintiff for the 
addition of the new defense in the Amended Answer of Appellant, would be 
premature and contrary to the terms of the Lease Agreement authorizing attorneys 
fees. See TS 1 Partnership v. Allred877 P.2d 156,(Utah App. 1994) 
Point 2. 
Did the District court abuse its discretion in awarding unreasonable attorneys 
fees to Plaintiff-Appellee in the amount of $5,488.00for fees allegedly 
incurred for the preparation of a summary judgment motion. 
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Assuming arguendo, that the District Court, had not committed reversible error 
in the premature award of attorney's fees . Did Plaintiff present enough evidence 
to determine that the award of attorneys' fees for bringing a summary judgment in 
the amount of $5,488.00 was reasonable. There are several factors, which should 
be used in the determination of whether attorneys are reasonable. In the case of 
Agency. Inc. v. Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210, (Utah 1989) these were outlined. 
Several Factors to consider in determining a reasonable attorneys fee are 
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount 
involved in the case and the result attained, and the experience of the 
attorneys involved. 
This is a standard case of non-payment of commercial rent. The firm of 
Prince, Yeats & Geldzahler handles multitudes of this type of case annually. The 
attorneys for the Plaintiff are experienced and as such very efficient. The research 
for this case has been done previously with all of the other non-payment of rent 
cases. This "boiler plate" memorandum was most is likely already stored in their 
computers. Even if Calculated at $150.00 per hour, a high hourly billing amount 
for this community, the preparation for this particular summary judgment motion 
and memorandum should not take 38.96 hours of time, especially in light of the 
caliber of attorneys representing the plaintiff/Appellee. This motion and 
memorandum should not have taken more than 10 hours. Therefore the 
maximum attorneys fee would be $1500.00. 
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It is interesting to note that the result attained is a factor. No result has been 
obtained since the case is not over and whether a breach of covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing has occurred, has yet to be determined.. 
Hence, it would appear that there is not sufficient record in the file to show the 
basis for the award of attorneys' fees was sufficient to even allow an appellate 
review of their reasonableness, let alone whether they were premature. 
Point 3. 
Did the District Court, in awarding unreasonable attorneys fees to Appellee, 
violate Appellant Thomas fs right of equal protection of the law as guaranteed 
by Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14* Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. 
To allow for the award of attorneys of such magnitude part way through the 
case, is a barrier to prevent anyone who is not as economically well off to be 
victimized by their opponent and prevented from seeing the case to a final 
conclusion. This is a denial of equal protection of the law as guaranteed by 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14th Amendment to the 
Untied States Constitution. By stopping a person from completing the case 
because they are ordered to pay the opposing party's attorneys fees prior to the 
conclusion of the case, especially when their claim or defense is meritorious, the 
Court is violating that person's rights to said equal protection of the law. 
10 
VI, CONCLUSION 
As stated, the award of attorney's fees in the as contained in 19.02 of the Lease 
Agreement, requires that the party seeking reimbursement for attorneys fees to be 
successful. To determine whether Appellee is successful, the case must come to a 
final conclusion. It has not. Therefore the award of attorneys fees by the District 
Court is a serious abuse of discretion. 
Further, even if the attorneys' fees could be awarded, the amount of the 
attorneys fees awarded is without sufficient foundation in the record. Further, the 
amount awarded appears to be extreme in light of the simplicity of the summary 
judgment motion for non- payment of monies due under a commercial lease, the 
expertise of the Appellee's attorneys, especially in efficiency, and the customary 
fees for this type of legal action in the community. The amount of $5,488.00 for 
this work is extreme. 
The award of attorneys fees part way through the case has a very "chilling" 
effect upon the Appellant completing the case. This "chilling" effect deprives 
Mr. Thomas of equal protection under the law. Both the Utah Constitution and 
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution provide for equal protection 
under the law. Therefore the award of attorneys fees prematurely results in Guy 
Thomas being deprived of equal protection under the law. 
Dated this 13th day of March, 1998. 
J. KHrfT HOLLAND 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Guy Thomas 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day March, 1998,1 caused to be served 
two true and correct copies of the OPENING BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT GUY THOMAS by hand delivery to the addressees below: 
Robert S. Young 
David K. Broadbent 
PRINE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert L. Booker 
BOOKER & ASSOCIATES 
New England Plaza, Suite 550 
349 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
12 
